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i . canon MODE mm COUPLED FAILDKES, AM 
Introduction 
2 B a series of studies of failures ana abnormal occurrences 
ia power plasts,, it tes proved possible to fatter som« statistical 
information oat common node failure, and also to learn something 
of r nmm in Bode failure phenomena. 
In this note, the observations are brought together, and some 
of the theoretical problems are discussed. Sone new data are 
presented, 
»Common node failure" has teen defined in several different 
ways. One of the first studies (Epler 1969) was concerned with 
failures in similar redundant units; 
The failure of all members of a group in a single environment 
is a recognized possibility in industry where officers of a 
corporation are discouraged from riding as a group in a single 
aeroplane. Similarly, attorneys often advise their clients 
to provide in their wills for the possibility of both husband 
and wife being killed in a single accident; this, in legal 
circles, is known as the "common disaster*. It would be 
expected that, when any group is made up of identical elements, 
all in the group would respond similarly to an externally 
applied stimulus; and, if failure resulted, this would be 
a common mode failure. When identical elements are used in 
a protection system, they are subject to simultaneous failure 
as a result of a single event, 
In the "Rasmussen report" (WASH-1400 Draft, Appendix IV 1974) 
a wider definition is given: 
With regard to the analyses performed in this study, common 
mode failures can be defined as multiple failures which are 
dependent, thereby causing Independent probabilities to be 
in reality dependent probabilities. The multiple failures 
are common mode or dependent because they result from a single 
initiating cause. 
The single initiating cause can be any one of a number of 
possibilities; a common property, a common process, a common 
environment, or a common external event. The multiple failures 
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which are dependent cad cannon node can likewise encompass 
a spectr« of possibilities; Multiple system failure caused 
by a cos—on component failure, system failures caused by * 
common external event, multiple component failures caused 
by a common defective manufacturing process, a sequence of 
failures caused by a common human operator, etc. 
Gangloff C1974J, in describing a method for anticipating 
potential common mode failure problems« defines common mode 
failures as "multiple unit failures due to a single cause** 
It is not easy to define common mode failure la a way which 
is sufficiently precis« to allow consistent statistics to be 
collected. Some of the problems involved are discussed later and 
a definition offered. 
The term "common mode failure* has tended to become "loaded'*, 
as being the most likely cause of "complete system failure" for 
many redundant systems. If one adopts one of the above definitions, 
and then attempts to collect statistical data concerning common 
mode failure, one finds, for nuclear power plant at least, that 
the incidence of "multiple unit failures due to m common cause* 
is relatively high. For these reasons, the term "coupled failure" 
is used to refer to such multiple failures, and the term "common 
node failure" is reserved for those cases in which "coupled 
failures" cause a complete subsystem to fail in a non fail-safe 
mode. 
The sections of this note deal with definition of coupled 
failure, classification, some theoretical considerations, a summary 
of statistical data collected in earlier studies, and some con-
clusions. 
Classification of coupled failures is treated in detail in 
this note, before definition of the term "coupled failure" is 
attempted. It is hoped that in this way, motivation for some of 
the finer points in the definition can bs explained. 
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2, CLASSIFICATION OF COUPLED FAILURES 
Gangloff classified canon node failures according t© cause 
(1974). The purpose of the classification was to provide a check 
list in discovering potential coupled failures. 
"Comon Node Failure 
Common node failures are multiple unit failures doe to 
a single cause. They are generally categorized by their cause 
into the five broad groups. Through suck categories, tine 
. reliability engineer can focus O R possibilities for rnmmcn 
•ode failure linies in a systematic way end consider tene 
potentiel causes one at a tine. Five categories generally 
used with perhaps sove variation ares 
1} External normal environment: This group takes into 
account such common-mode causative factors as dust, dirt, 
humidity, and temperature which are the normal extremes of 
the operating environment. 
2) Equipment design deficiency; This group takes account 
of design and installation features and practices which give 
rise to either electrical or mechanical interdependence 
between system components between subsystems of the same 
system, or upon a single common element. Also included in 
this group are those cases of dependence on equipment or 
parameters whose failure or abnormality causes the transient 
requiring protection. 
3) Operation and maintenance errors: This group included 
carelessness, improper adjustment or calibration. Improper 
maintenance, and other human factors which are inadvertent, 
but must be considered possible. 
4) External phenomena: This included such natural events 
as tornado, fire, flood, and earthquake which can effect 
every system in the plant. 
5) Functional deficiency: This group of factors covers 
those possibilities where the design may be inadequate either 
be .»use of erroneous predictions about the behaviour or 
usefulness of variables monitored predictions of the effec-
tiveness of protection action to be taken." {Ganglcff 1974). 
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COUPLED FAILURES 
\ 
Simultaneously 
triggered failures 
Misoperations in Triggered 
safety procedure latent failures 
Consequent failures 
\ Common input or 
supply dependency 
Overload of 
parallel components 
Cascade failures 
interface failures 
\ 
Subsystem interaction 
Failure in switching 
to standby 
Operation and maintenance errors 
Similar component failures 
Statistically coupled failures 
' \ 
Too long test period 
Lifetimes end together 
Batch quality variation 
Fig. 1. Types of failure coupling. 
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The classification offered in this note is according to 
failure mechanism or process. The purpose is to provide * basis 
for a study off common node failure probabilities. Failure types 
which grouped together in this classification, will require 
similar statistical models to predict their probability. 
In Pig. 1 a classification is shown which covers all the 
types of coupled failures observed in the earlier studies. Some 
of the types of "coupling" are not the kind which one normally 
associates with common sod« failure. These are shown with, broken 
lines in the classification of Pig. 1 and are Included for 
completeness. Most of the terms used require further clarification. 
Triggered failures are those failures which can only Bake 
themselve, felt as a result of some previous failure or unusual 
occurrence, there are two subclasses: aisoperation failures in 
safety or shut down procedures; and triggered (revealed} 
latent failures. Triggered failures are not usually regarded as 
common mode failures. Triggered failures are included in this 
classification for completeness, but are not discussed further. 
Consequent failures are those which are the direct result 
of some earlier failure. That is, some initial failure is the 
direct cause of the consequent failure. There are three subclasses; 
common dependency failures; parallel component overload failures; 
and cascade failures. 
Common dependency failures are those in which two or »ore 
components fail because of the failure of some third component 
on which they are dependent. Failure of common power supplies, 
failure of common cooling air supplies, or failure of common 
supportxag frameworks, give rise to examples. 
Two mechanisms have been observed which give rise to overload 
coupled failures. In the first, some external event occurs which 
imposes on overload on two components operating in parallel. In 
the second, one component of a parallel pair fails, and in so 
doing puts an extra load or transient on its pair. 
Cascade failures are those which arise when one component 
fails, and then destroys further components. Fire, flooding, excessive 
vibration, and missiles generated in an initial failure, can all 
give rise to cascade failures. 
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Interface failures are those which can occur when two systems 
ax« connected together. There are three subclasses, subsystem 
interactions, human operations common to both systems, and 
failures in switching between redundant subsystems. 
The importance of distinguishing interface coupled failures 
is that, to take account of their effects, one can (hopefully) 
regard then as a perturbation or modification of the primary re-
liability analyses for subsystems (c.f. lOSH H O W , without needing 
to treat an entire plant in each subsystem reliability analysis. 
Similar component coupled failures are those which arise 
in components of the same type. These are the roost common in 
practice, and the only class for which any statistical analysis has 
been attempted in this report. 
For components which work intermittently or are subject to 
intermittent loads, varying requirements or environments, a clear 
distinction must made between the "cause" of a failure and its 
"trigger". The cause is the process or event which causes the 
componsnt to be in a failed state, that is, unable to perform 
according to specifications in all specified circumstances. The 
failure may remain latent until some trigger event occurs. The 
trigger event is a normally occurring event, or at least, an event 
which would not normally lead to failure. If the component were 
not in a failed state, the component would perform correctly. But 
since failure has occurred, the trigger causes the latent failure 
to be revealed. A "failure to operate" occurs. For intermittently 
operating components "failures to operate" are of primary interest. 
The types of coupling which have been observed in similar 
components in practice are 
(a) Coupling due to failure rate variation of components from 
batch to batch, when two components are drawn from the same 
batch, or due to failure rate variation from Installation 
to installation, 
(b) Coupling due to joint variation of failure rates with time, 
for example due to wearout, infant mortality, or environment 
effects. 
(c) Coupling due to variations in sensitivity to particular failure 
trigger events, from batch to batch of components or from 
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installation tø installation. 
(di Coupling due to a common failure cause, which works immediately, 
or due to destructive effects of failure of one component on 
another. This group is similar to the "eonseqtteat failures-
described earlier, but here is restricted to coupled failures 
in similar components. 
These types of coupling provide a rational basis for classi-
fication according to cause, but unfortunately groups (a) and (b) 
are often difficult to distinguish fro» each other. Also there 
are large differences in the types of failures which can occur, 
depending on whether the components work intermittently, or 
continuously. 
For these reasons, the following four groups were used in 
classifying data, according to the types of reliability models 
required in determining coupled »ode failure probability« 
I Failures due to design, installation errors etc. which cannot 
be detected during normal testing procedures, but which reveal 
themselves under unusual operating conditions. If the unusual 
conditions occur, then failure is generally certain. This 
grouping corresponds to coupling type (c) above. In the 
examples observed, the components were generally intermittently 
operated. 
II Failures resulting from effects (poor design, installation, 
bad batch of components or environmental effects) leading to 
an unusually high failure rate during stand-by or ready 
waiting. There is then a higher than expected probability that 
several components will fail between activations or tests. 
This grouping corresponds to classes (a) and (b) above. It 
was the most common type of coupled failure in the examples 
studied. 
For this kind of failure, the frequency of coupled failure 
will vary, depending on test frequency. In practice, the 
Jistinetion between continuously operating and intermittent, 
instantaneously operating triggers, is not so clear cut. For 
example the problem of environmental sensitivity of components, 
leading to latent failure, may be important over a period 
of a fefc days during the winter. 
Some of these considerations are illustrated in figure 2. 
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y test test 
- 1 - A teaa ft 
foiturecause 'instantaneous' ..__ 
e.g. maintenance coupled failure •«"• 
error 
_3 å If A 
'separated* 
coupled failure 
X J i . 
t f 
widely separated failures 
with common cause 
extra test 
_ i A k = ^ i A 
single failures 
with common cause 
Fig. 2. Test interval dependence of 
coupled failure frequency 
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XII Failures resulting from misadjustment or environmental effects 
on a group of continuously operating components, so that all 
fail . hortly afterwards; or failures resulting from misoperation 
of a group of componentsj or consequent failures in general, 
•this class corresponds to coupling type {d) above. 
IV Failures arising from effects similar to those in class II 
but giving an unusually high failure rate in operation, so 
that one component fails while another is being repaired. 
{Only one instance of this type was found in the cases studied). 
Note that the main practical difference between type I and 
type II coupled failures is that with type IIr increasing testing 
frequency c a a reduce the probability of coupled failure. 
Statistically coupled failures are those which affect several 
components simultaneously, in spite of the fact that, if the failures 
occurred separately, they would be regarded as "normal" random 
failures. In other words, any of the other coupled failure mechanisms 
may be present. Their presence is not however recognised directly, 
but only via their effect on system failure rates. The classes are 
similar to those for similar component coupled failures. 
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3. EXAMPLES OF COUPLED FAILURE 
The first eight of the following examples, intended to 
illustrate the classification of coupled failures, are taken 
from US Power Reactor abnormal occurrence reports. All were 
discovered during system testing, or had only United safety 
consequences -
Other examples are taken from USAEC Reactor Operating 
Experiences reports. 
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1) 
the aaia'atcan iaolation velvea, W they exietet after the 
doaa on January 31, 19T0, leaked to area an extant that the* raaator eemM 
not ha preesorised to 20 pale ay the eerviee air eyetea. Bane* a« later 
aeeaareaeBte, i t i s eetlaeted that tbtt ayatea cea deliver epprcatiaately 
9000 CFH to the »actor ressel In the aanner la which It vat pipe« «p. It 
la believed that ton air delivered to the reactor leaked put ES03B and 
ESCftB causing a pressure build op In the down stress ateaa line and header 
* 
piping due to en externel force en ES031 caused ay Ito hanfer support and 
externally induced etreeeea on MO** frea ito banger and pedeetal support. 
to to* preeeure built up in the ateaa teat«, tte air leaked teat through 
EBCU, wMch ves asåsr aioilar otrceoea to those em ES<AB. 
Docket 50-219 March 1970 
A coupled failure of type I (intermittently operating 
component, revealed during testing). The failure is apparently 
caused by mechanical interaction of the components with their 
mountings. 
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1
 lack, dlaaal apasrater at Cratar Cros* i s cajadmft with 
O H , lXHplloa faal oli ter t«ak, en« Mia faal o i l pass valch 
tafeaa suction fro« tb* ter tank, and tao faal oU traoafer ptaspa 
wMea tak* auction froa tos 15,000-fallon aaln oU tank. Tha 
faal oi l larel la tha ter tank la controllad by float svitaboo 
locatad la tha day tank aod overata ae that aa faal la i imaiaaail 
IT tba antJaa aad tao foal laral drapa, a faal tmnafar aviteh 
will activate ttaa ao. 1 f æ l tranaf er pwp to —f?***t» tba ter 
taak level. If tba fuel level continues to drop, saother lav 
level transfer switch will activate faal transfer paa» aa. i 
aad a local anaweiator at tba unit will indicate a faal traaafar 
faalt. 
9w tao faal oil tranafar paopa ave operated sy 239-wolt* 
•fngtir phaaa. capacitor atart aotora. Upon lnveeticetioa 1% waa 
fooad that both •øtor-atarting switche* wore aet aaklas preatr 
eoatact so toot, at tiaaa, tba poopa weal« rua aad at otbar tlaaa 
they would not. la thi« instance, aeltbsr tha DO. 1 poap aer tha 
liaiiliaj ao. 2 pos? atartad. Aa a result, tba ter taak waat captr 
aad tba angtna abut dowa./ 
Docket 50-219 Jan 1972 
This is probably a type I coupled failure. 
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3) 
A plant shutdown had progressed to the point where, with 
electrical output at approximately 90 !We, a transfer of station 
loads from the Auxiliary Transformer to the Startup Transformers 
was attempted. When a closing signal was applied to the S1A 
breaker, a loss of power occurred the the "IA" 4160V AC bus, 
which among other things caused two circulatory water pumps, 
three reactor recirculation pumps and the operating condensate 
and feedwater pumps to trip. Diesel Generator-(Fl started in the 
"Fast Start* mode, reenergizing the 4160V "1C" bus and the 
requisite safeguard power supplies. An attempt was made to start 
the B and C condensate pumps, fcut before either pump could be 
started, the reactor scrammed due to low water level. Automatic 
transfer to the SIB transformer was accomplished, but later in 
attempting to start a condensate pump powered from the "IB" 
4160V bus, SIB tripped initiating the "Fast Start" sequence on 
Diesel Generator#2. The second CRD pump was started to assist 
in monitoring reactor water level which dropped to 9 feet above 
the active fuel. The reactor was isolated to prevent water inven-
tory loss and the emergency condensers were initiated ^as needed 
to remove decay heat. The point at which reactor isolation occurs 
and the emergency cooling system is initiated was not reached. 
CAUSES 
The problem was traced to an incorrect setting of the current 
transformer ratio matching taps for the C phase differential 
relay on both startup transformers. In attempting to either carry 
a sizeable load or start a large loud, a differential fault was 
sensed, tripping the output breakers. 
Docket 50-219-319 
A type I coupled failure involving a sequence of switchings from 
one redundant component to another. 
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On »torch 14, 1971 et approximately 2:55 F.M. am incident 
occurred et the B. B. Bobineon Unit Mo. Z tbet led to the fallere 
of the turbine. After a reactor trin and sahoeonont turbine trin, 
lubricating oil flov was leet to tee turbine and generetor bearing«. 
lne rotor cane to reet in the abnormally short tine of approximately 
17 minutes and eeised in several failed bearing«. 
assessment of tint damage indicated that all elgbt turbine 
and generator bearing« bad ntffared sone damage. Bearings 4 and 5, 
between the two leu pressure turbines, failed to the extent that 
molten babbit flowed through the bearing«. 
During the reactor shutdown, seal flov was interrupted to 
two reactor coolant poops for approximately one minute. Subsequent 
investigation indicated the shaft for "A" reactor coolant pomp may 
have been distorted by uneven heating* Ails pump has been disassembled • 
and • new shaft i« being installed, flie aeal on •** reactor .coolant 
pomp will be disassembled for inspection before the unit is returned to 
service.' 
Docket 50-261-57 
A type I coupled failure, resulting from a cascade failure. 
In the following pages, the sequence of events in this 
occurrence are quoted, to give some idea of the complexity 
in some cascade failures. 
-1? -
Tb» snit was oa the liat carrying a load of 615 Met a* directed 
by th* syateai load dispatcher, all »lamt coadltloaa n a n aooeal. The 
operating eta« was conducting the weekly routine checkoff of plant 
•:30 A.M. auxiliary Operator checked battery rooa and noted all 
iodicatioD* normal in process of completing the ahift 
Auxiliary Operator check-off liat. 
10:30 A.M. Auxiliary Operator started DC emergency oil pea«, fad 
from "a" battery bus, for routine tao (2) hoar test 
run« This puna wee not etopped a* planned at 12:30 P.M. 
because the Auxiliary Operator beeaas involved in otter 
routine duties. All canditlona rantnid neraal vatil 
shortly before the reactor trip. One aumnHij alar« 
was received on "B" battery chargaz tremble aaaaaciator. 
The alara cleared inaedietely and no farther trouble 
experienced oa *V* battery or battery charger. 
2:49 P.M. The plant computer failed. Subsequent iavestlgatloa 
indicated the failure vas da* to low DC voltage fee 
froa battery bat "A". 
2:50 P.M. The Control Operator observed reactor trip breaker "A** 
indication light was oat and the Shift Fereaaa was notified. 
The bulb was changed with no success. Several other light* 
on RTGB were observed to be out. The Shift Foreaan ant 
Control Operator suspected instruænt bas (AC) trouble. 
I & C technician assistance was aimwoneri and Shift Foreman 
proceeded to check out KCG-5 and MCC-6 aad all instruBent 
busses for failure. 
2:52 P.M. Received reactor coolant paaps thermal barrier cooling 
water low flow alara. Outlet isolation valve 735 (air 
operated) closed on low DC control voltage, RTG9 valve 
position indication also lost. 
2:55 P.M. Received reactor trip due to lew voltage on DC trip coils 
on reactor trip breakers. Reactor trip initiated turbine 
trip, wo battery charger alarms ware received. 
2:56 P.M. Received generator lockout (one aAnote tin* delay) due to 
OCB closed and stop valves closed. A portion of the control 
rooa lights were lost. 4RV bus 4 switched to start-op 
transformer properly laaving 4KV bus 3 and 4 oa • " £ - « * 
transformer, 4RV bussei 1 and 2 were lost because DC eon-
trol voltage oa "A" battery was w o low to eloaa breaker 
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52/12 and pat these b a m on the »tart-op trnsaforaer. 
"A- diesel started properly em to I M S of M b u voltage. 
Dieeel supply breaker i n to 1-1 bas did" aot CIOM btcsiis* 
of lav DC control w i t ty* fro* "A" battery. 
Ik« Shift Fnrra«i ans! several etfccr individuals while checking 
oa 4If voltage found ao DC control voltage oa several breaker*. 
TJM batteries wet« checked ianediately and "A" battery was 
found with 60 volts aai "0H asps. All breakers on "A" battery 
bas were closed, The AC supply from HCC-5 to the "A" battery 
charger was lost when ACT teases 1 aai 2 v e n les t . 
I t ahoold be noted that the battery chargers are rated at 
300 aaos with a current Uniting device set; rx approxJaately 
375 aapa. It has been reported that the norael DC load on 
the "A" bus 1* approxiaately 150 BOB«. stswmfng a ISO east 
lead taposed by the DC emergency o i l pwap, the load oa the 
90 tea could have tees as high a* 500 apps. This would have 
laposed a ainiaua discharge rat« on the "A" battery of at 
least 125 »ad possibly as aneh as 200 any*. A 200 any 
discharge rate wi l l lower battery voltage to 105V DC in 
approxlaately fear hoars assualng a rally charged battery 
in i t ia l ly . 
3:00 P.M. The "B" charging punp was lost when E-l voltage was lost . 
the "C charging soap was started i sardlately to re-establish 
seals and charging flew. The seal leak-off temperature on 
reactor coolant poops "A" and "C rose sharply as indicated. 
f A 8CP 
Recorder Point So. 1 - Seal leakoff 300*F. 
Recorder Point No. 2 - Opper thrust 300 P. 
Recorder Point Ho. 7 - Pony bearing is 280 p. 
#B 8CP 
Becorder Point No. 15 - Pump bearing Is 230 P. 
»C RCP 
Recorder Point No. 17 - Seal leakeff 200J. 
leeorder Point Ho. 23 - Puap bearing 230 P. 
"A* and " C pumps tripped when 4 W busses 1 sad 2 were lost. 
The seal flow on "A" and "C" pusps decreased to tero. "1* . 
punp continued to run with noraal tesnerstnre and seal flaw* 
Charging flew was lost for leaf than on* minute. ' 
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The vetaae central teak hed ae Level »edfcatod. Acetater 
switched to refueling teeter storage teak rar supply tø 
ro-oatoolisa volani control teak far safety to re-estebliak 
volaae control teak level. Switched keek to aeraal lineup 
after 30 inches Indicated ia votas coarxol taak* 
4 safety Injection alga*! was activated due to instraaeatatloa 
poser supply fallere. Fressurlxer level reaaleed above 201 
aad pressure above 2000 »elg. All- eafety Injection eeulpaeat 
except that £raa B-l boa operated eatlafactorlly. 
Operator observed tuning gear oil paap and emergency DC »ål 
puap lights acre oat. 
3:12 P.M. The turbine rolled te a stop epprexfaately 1? adnata* alter 
the turbine trip. Condenser vacuus was aaintalatd. A e .\C 
turbine gear oil peep ves not operable dae te less of MCC-5 
faaar supply; i.e., loss ef 4KP bas 1 aai inability of diesel 
breaker 171 to eleee. The DC eaergeaey oil paap was aot 
operable dae to lov voltege on "A" battery. 
3:20 P.M. The battery bus tie was closed sad "A" battery voltage 
laaed'ately increased to 123 volte. Breaker 15B closed 
re-establishing voltage oa B-l froa "A" diesel. The Control 
Operator closed breaker 52/12 end picked ap 4KV basses 1 sat 
2 froa the start-up transforaer. l»e Control Operator re-
established power to 480V baa 1 via station service trans-
foner "A". The turning gear oil pomp started vhee B-l pover 
was re-established. The generetor oli Uft paap started end 
the turning gear engaged attempting to roll the turbine, the 
turbine would not torn and the turning gear motor began — — K f , 
heavily. The taming gear aeter was aaaaally tripped. Pneac 
cessful atteapts were aade to roll the turbine aanually and 
with en air drive aotor. Oil was pouring froa the He* 5 
carbine bearing. All atteapts to roll the turbine .were unsuc-
ceesful. 
Condenser vacuus and s teas seels were esintained on the unit 
and steaa duap continued to the condenser. 
Restoration of DC power provided for opening of valve 735 „ 
to restore reactor coolant paap thermal barrier flow. 
3:25 P.M. Bestored normal letdown from reactor coolant ayetea. 
Approxiaately five (5) alautee after restoring power to norael, 
KCC-6 tripped. Operator was unable to close breaker. Ike
 f 
control fuses were replaced And the breaker then closed properly. 
— £. 'J _ 
9:90 tjat* Tuning gear oil and lift ptsap were secured doc to oil leakage 
f roa MB* 5 turbine bearing. 
Vita the reactor in a safe condition, aseessaent of the tor* 
bine daaage coaneneed. ' 
The Incident was determined to hare been initiated by the decrease 
ia "A* battery voltage to the point where components supplied by the "A" 
DC tes could not function as designed* severe 1 factors contributed to the 
leas of volta«« on MA* DC tea and the failure to detect this decrease in 
voltage. 
1. The DC emergency oil puaa> was operating froa the "A** 
DC boa. This resulted in aa unanticipated discharge 
of the "A" battery. Due to personnel error,, this pan? 
was left operating and not shutdown after the scheduled 
two hour test. 
Operating procedures and operator training are 
being reviewed to insure that unsatisfactory conditions 
are corrected, 
2. Bo alarm la provided to warn the Control Operator of 
low DC boa voltage. The installation of suitable alarum 
is being Investigated. 
3. The AC oil pump is currently fed off of KCC-5. With the 
loss of E-l voltage, KCC-5 is without a power supply. 
The possibility of changing the AC oil pimp power supply 
to KCC-6 is being investigated in order to provide a 
completely redundant back-up lubricating oil supply to the 
turbine. / 
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5) 
Chi July f, » 7 3 , »bile operating at 941 fewer. "B" Safety Injection 
Paem* tripped apes, initiation of a neaaal seazt far a routine periodic Mat. 
checks of "A" and "C" puaa« reeuUed ta the tripping of "c* aaap 
atartlag. Thia condition vaa dlaeovered at appi m |n»i e l j 0900 heare 
abtfe atteapfiag to »apply aakeup water to the Safety Injection Systca 
miag "V Safety Injection Piof. An Investigation of eft« frrfftiit 
Chat the neap trips net« the result of tha lastantaaeotta otetmnaut 
trlpa oa (fee p«Bff> hreakere being «*t at their ajtalam valne. Further 
Investigation ay Hestinghottee aaxviea pereaanel verified that tha aetnal eettlag 
oa the trip starless for "I* and T pops was epproelnately 100 aspens aslev 
sett ing. The instantaneooe trip settings ea cheae hreefcera 
to afprwwfiwjialy 751« of sea* plate rating, aad the fas** sere 
sst lsfacterl ly teated and latuioed to service. / 
Docket 50-261-226 
A type 1 coupled f a i l u r e a r i s i n g from des ign or i n s t a l l a t i o n 
error . 
6} 
IS ACC0RDASCE «ITH SECTIOH 6.6.2 OF THE TECH«ICAL SPECIFICAT10R. 
THE FOLLOWING ABNORMAL OCCURABCE IS REPORTED« 
AT 1450 HOURS OR 6-5-73, VHIU IHVESTI3ATIN3 AHD ABRORNAL IRDICATI0I 
OR THE »ARROW RANGE COHTAIRKERT PRESSURE INDICATUR, IT HAS 
F0UH0 THAT 5 5/8 IHCH VERT VALVES OR THE PRESSURE SENSINO LIRE 
TO ALL eORTAlRHERT PRESSURE TRARSMTTERS VERE OPER. THIS RESULTED 
1H ERRONEOUS SIGNALS TO PT'S >50, WI» *52» » 3 , »54, AND »55, 
WHICH SUPPLY IRPUTS TO RTSB IROICATURS ARO SAFEGUARD RACKS. ' 
Docket 50-261-186 
A type I coupled failure, presumably arising from an operator 
or procedural error. 
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7) 
On Thursday, August 31, 1972, an inspection of the four RHR 
pump minimum flow protection flow switches for actuator paddle 
integrity was performed. The inspection revealed that a large 
piece of the paddle on No. 13 RHR pump flow switch and a small 
piece of the paddle on Ho. 11 RHR pump flow switch had broken 
off and were presumably carried down the associated RHR lines 
with flow.* 
Docket 50-263-153 
A type II coupled failure presumably arising from a design 
error ( see Taylor U974) for a definition of design error). 
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8) 
At 1930 hours on June 17, 1972, the two series-installed 
air operated primary containment sample return isolation valves, 
8501-3A and 8501-3B, failed to close during the quarterly testing 
required by Section 4.7.D.1.C(1> of the Technical Specifications. 
Both valves were last satisfactorily tested on April 30, 1972. 
Investigation of the valves verified that the control 
signals were properly de-energizing the valve solenoids and 
thereby bleeding the air off the air operator diaphragac. 
Visual observation indicated that the problem was physical 
binding within the valves. 
Satisfaction of Section 3.7.D.2 of the Technical Specifi-
cations was achieved by closing a manual valve, 2-9201-500, 
located between the air operated valves and the primary con-
tainment. 
Repairs to both valves were effected on June 19, 1972, by 
loosening the packing nuts and lubricating the valve shafts. 
The valves were operated several times from the control room, . 
the packing nuts readjusted, and then the valves were operated 
several times again. After this switching both valves operated 
satisfactorily. ' 
Docket 50-237-242 
This is probably a type II coupled failure. Valve sticking 
presumably arose by drying out of lubrication, which is a 
slow process. Increasing inspection or servicing frequency 
could therefore have reduced coupled failure probability. 
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9} 
During a hot shutdown of Unit 1 of the lion Station, reactor 
coolant loop B was isolated, reactor coolant pump IB was secured, 
and the B main steam isolation valve (MSIV) was subsequently 
closed due to a malfunction of the MSIV closure circuit. Since 
loop B was isolated fro« the steam generator, the steam temperature 
dropped. This caused pressure in this loop, P4, to drop below 
that of loops A, C and D whose pressure values are designated as 
Pj, ?2 and p3 respectively in Figure 1, the "As Built" wiring 
diagram. 
The pressure drop in loop P4 caused bistables 534A, 516C and 525A 
in the circuit logic to trip, producing half trips on three of the 
four protection channels related to loops A, C and D. Since a 
2/3 logic is required, no safety injection trip signal for loop B 
was received. 
As seen in Figure 2, bistables 534B, 5160 and 5258 would have 
tripped if the circuit logic had been wired correctly, producing 
the appropriate safety injection signal. However, even with the 
appropriate signal, actual safety injection would not have occurTd, 
nor should have it occurred based on the design of the circuit, 
because all the loop isolation valves were closed. 
An investigation by Commonwealth Edison personnel revealed that 
wires feeding the input signals to the dual comparators (514A/B, 
534A/B, 515A/B, 525A/B, 516C/D and 526C/D) were wired in reverse 
from what they should have been for proper operation. This made a 
portion of the safety injection system initiation circuit inoperable.' 
R.O.E. 1975 
A type I coupled failure arising from an error on a wiring 
diagram. It is often difficult to decide in the cise of 
wiring errors, whether there are several separate channel 
errors, or one error at the system level. 
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Common Mode Failure of Local Power Range Monitors 
10) During the startup of Unit 1 of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station 
In September 1972, the plant had reached operational temperature 
and pressure, with the reactor power at IOC MW(t). Mien the operator 
noted an Indication that the resins In one of the demineralizers 
were becoming depleted, he switched a second demineraliser into 
service. Since only condensate was being recirculated and no 
addition to the reactor coolant was necessary at the tine, the 
operator proceeded with the startup. Half an hour later, high 
conductivity of the feedwater was noted, and the operator initiated 
a deliberate reactor shutdown. Ten minutes after reactor shutdown 
was begun, resins in both condensate deraincralizers were completely 
depleted. An hour later, the operations supervisor ordered the 
reactor to he scrammed manually because of excessive chlorides In 
the primary system. The main steaa line isolation valves were 
shut and the isolation condenser was placed in service to continue 
cooldown of the plant. 
About 30 minutes after the isolation condenser was placed into service, 
the first LP",M failed. Witifn the ne?-:t 24 hours, all of the LPRM's 
had failed. 
Of the 120 faile.i detectors, 116 showed low detector-to-cable 
resistance, indicating that the seal weld on the detector-to-cabie 
shields had faileJ. This was substantiated by the upscale failures 
of the detectors, indicating very "ow resistance between the 
detector sipnal wire and the cable shield. Subsequent metallographic 
investigations revealed that chloride stress corrosion had caused 
the failures. ..o significant indications were obtained from dye-
penetrant testing of the LPP.'! cables. This led to the conclusion that 
the route for entry of moisture into the cables was provided through 
the cable collars, througn the c.iaraber fill tubes, or through both 
paths. 
The source of tue moisture and high chloride content in the reactor 
coolant was in-leakage of about 17 gpm of seawater into the hot 
wells of the main condensers through leaking condenser tubes. The 
resulting chloride concentration in the reactor coolant caused the 
demineralizer resins to become depleted rapidly and resulted in 
rapid buildup of chloride concentration in the reactor cooling 
system. 
All the l.PRM detectors were replaced while the plant was shut down 
for maintenance and cleanup of the affected systems. 
To prevent recurrence of this type of event, all 40,000 aluminum-
brass condenser tubes were replaced with copper-nickel tubes to 
provide better resistance to chloride corrosion attack. Also, 
instrumentation was added to monitor condenser water chemistry. 
Procedures for reactor operation have been changed and at itional 
technical specifications have been effected. ' 
P..0.E. August 1973 
A type III coupled failure. 
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11) 
UNCOUPLED CONTROL RODS 
During startup of Unit No. 1 of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station after 
a 1973 fall refueling outage, instruments did not verify that four control 
rods were properly coupled to their control rod drives <CRD*s), so each 
affected control rod was fully inserted and the control rod drive electrically 
disarmed and removed from service. After reactor shutdown on August 31, 
1974, it was determined that each of the suspected control rods had not 
been properly coupled in the 1973 refueling outage; they were found lodged 
between their associated fuel assemblies. So damage was noted. 
It was concluded the control rods became uncoupled because procedures 
followed during the refueling outage were not performed in the proper 
sequence. Although a satisfactory pull test had been completed for each 
of the eighty control rods in the core, the test was completed prior to 
loading the four associated fuel assemblies. As a result, it was possible 
for a control rod to rotate 90* and become unlatched from the control 
rod drive coupling spud.' 
Power Reactor 
Current Events 1974 
A type I coupled failure. 
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Circumstances 
12) 
On October 20, 1973, a turbine vibration alarm was annunciated on 
the control panel of Unit 1 of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating 
Station. One minute later, saltwater intrusion was indicated by 
nigh conductivity alarms fro« monitors located in the condenser. 
An investigation to determine the cause of .both alarms vas started 
immediately. Approximately forty minutes after the turbine vibration 
alarm, a systematic load decrease vas begun; and one hour and 
fifteen minutes after the alarm was received, the plant was removed 
from the line and the plant load was switched to the auxiliary 
transformers. 
Approximately eight minutes after the plant load had been switched, a 
noload turbine trip alarm was received, although the turbine had been 
removed from service. The trip alarm caused the turbine stop 
valves to close. During removal of the plant from the line, the 
operator had failed to switch the feedwater control system to 
manual. This sequence of events caused the feedwater regulating 
valves to open automatically to SO": of full open because the avera?«* 
primary coolant temperature was greater than 540 degrees F. The 
switching of the feedwater control from automatic to manual is a 
standard requirement for a routine shutdown-
The opening of the feedwater valves allowed the average temperature 
and pressure of the reactor coolant to drop rapidly. The water 
level in the steam generators was observed to be increasing rapidly, 
the pressurizer level had decreased -to 10% and the letdown valve 
had closed. The rapid filling of the steaa generators resulted in 
a rapid cooldown and decrease in the total pressure of the primary 
system. 
the primary system controls were placed in the manual mode and one 
of the control rod banks was pulled to mitigate further drops in 
primary system pressure and temperature. Feedwater control was 
also changed to the manual mode, the feedwater control valves were 
closed, and the feedwater block valves were manually closed. 
This rapid cooldown and decrease in total primary system pressure 
resulted in the automatic initiation of the safety injection system 
(SIS). Although no Safety Limits or other Technical Specifications 
had been exceeded, approximately 1300 gallons of borated water from 
the refueling tank entered the primary system through the charging 
pump. The borated water did not enter through the safety injection 
lines because the system pressure still had not dropped below the 
actuation point. 
The failures of the valve motor operator and pipe support equipment 
were attributed to a water hammer that occurred in the SIS loop 
caused by trapped air accumulated by normal tnleakage. The mot i en 
of the piping generated sufficient force to shear the turnbuckle-
type hanger and to cause the tensile failure of four bolts (0.17-
inch diameter) that hold the casting of the valve motor operator to 
the safety Injection valve. The failure of these four bolts re-
sulted in the motor casing, =tator, and eni bell dropping from 
their mountings. 
ROE 74-15 
A cascade coupled failure. 
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4. DEFINITION OF COUPLED FAILURE 
A simple practical definition of coupled failure is readily 
given 
"coupled failures are simultaneous failures of several 
components as a result of a common cause". 
To be useful in all cases this definition must be further 
specified. What is a "simultaneous failure"?-The only reasonable 
definition which this author could obtain, is that by "simultaneous 
failure" we mean that several components are in a failed state at 
the same time. 
Whether two failures are considered to occur or just onet 
depends on the degree to which a system is divided into components. 
For example, if two contacts on the same switch fail because they 
are both dirty, is this a case of coupled failure or a single 
failure?. 
A reasonable criterion for dividing a system into components 
was presented in the Rasmussen report (WASH 1400, Draft 1974): 
"[In the study] 
The analyses were generally developed to a component level of 
resolution where a component refers to a hardware entity for 
which failure data are generally available. For example, more 
data are available for a diesel-generator than for the diesel, 
generator and auxiliaries taken Individually; therefore, a 
diesel-generator would not ordinarily be analyzed into its 
constituent parts. In some cases, however, more in-depth 
analysis was required solely to determine the logical re-
lationship between various inputs to a component. For example, 
the interlocks between two air circuit breakers may not be 
apparent unlesF ":he circuit breakers close and trip circuits 
considered In the evaluation". 
For our purposes, the principle can be expressed more shortly. 
A system is divided into components to a level where failure data 
are generally available, and is then further divided, If two parts 
of a component have different functions. 
In recording failure data, a coupled failure is considered to 
have occurred if two components (that is, units for which failure 
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data is generally collected) are in a failed state simultaneously. 
In addition if two parts of a single component, each of which serves a 
different function, fail, then a coupled failure is recorded. 
This definition raises another question; should all simul-
taneous failures arising frost a common cause be regarded as 
coupled failures; or only those failures occurring in redundant 
components. In this note, all simultaneous failures arising from 
a common cause are regarded as coupled failures irrespective of 
whether the failed components are redundant. 
To make the definition complete, "failure" is defined, A 
"failure occurs" when a component cannot operate according to its 
specification when called on to do so, or when a component ceases 
to operate according to its specification while it is still called 
on to do so. A component is in a failed state, if it is unable to 
operate as specified. 
The definition of coupled failure given above, when qualified 
as indicated, is adequate, provided that the failure cause on 
trigger acts only over short period of time, or can be regarded 
as an instantaneous event. The definition is also practical, in 
such cases. It is easy to tell whether a coupled failure has 
occurred or not, in all cases where either the failure cause is 
known, or failure modes are identical. 
A problem arises with this definition, however, if the cause 
of failure is a phenomenon which works slowly and continuously. The 
problem is best illustrated by an example. 
Consider the case of two filament lamps, continuously operating 
subject to vibration. If high levels of vibration occur occasionally, 
the lamps may fail at times which are very close to each other 
(within one second). One could normally say that the failures are 
coupled. At some lower level of vibration (still periodic, or 
occasional) there may be some strong correlation between failure 
times , There will be some vibration level which is "normal" but 
even that level will be subject to "normal" variations. As a result, 
even normal failure rates will imply some correlation between 
failure times. 
In practice, this kind of failure behaviour is important when 
components with limited lifetimes are used; in corrosion failures; 
and in failures arising from occasional environment extremes. 
As a result of this kind of problem, it becomes impossible to 
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distinguish between coupled and independent failures in many cases, 
if the phenoraenological definition given above is used. 
As an alternative to the definition above, which is in terms 
of failure causes, one can look more directly at the purpose of 
collecting coupled failure data, or of interest in coupled failure. 
This interest generally arises from the fact that reliability or 
availability of redundant systems is reduced if there Is a possi-
bility of coupling of failures. 
A "coupling coefficient" can be derived for the probability 
of failure of two components, A and B as 
c
 " FTATPTBT 
Here P (A,B) is the probability that both components fail 
when a particular coupling mechanism is present, P(A) and P(B) 
are the failure probabilities when the coupling mechanism is not 
present, or when it affects the two components with independent 
probability. 
In general, there will be several possible coupling coef-
ficients, depending on whether the probabilities used are re-
liabilities, point availabilities, limiting availabilities etc. 
A possibility for coupled failure is said to exist, if a coupling 
coefficient is greater than one. Coupled failures are said to have 
occurred, if a mathematical model explaining the failure prob-
ability yields a coupling coefficient greater than one. 
The reasoning here follows very closely that given in the 
Rasmussen Report (WASH 1400 Draft Appendix IV). 
A subtle point concerns precisely which probabilities should 
be used for P(A) and P(B) in the formula given above. If failure 
probabilities observed in actual practice in the plant are used, 
then coupling effects due to design errors, poor quality component 
batches, etc. will not be relevant, and will not be reflected in 
the coupling coefficient. If a priori estimates for P(A), P(B) are 
used, then the coupling coefficient will reflect such coupling 
effects. 
In a similar way, if P(A), P(B) and P(A,B) are point values, 
functions of time, then the coupling coefficient may vary with 
time, but it will not directly reflect the effects of "clustering" 
of failures in time. If, on the other hand, probability averages 
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over a period of tis« are used then the coupling effect of hasard 
rate vatiations with tine (such as those caused by environmental 
effects) will be reflected directly in the-coupling coefficient. 
Difficulties in deciding whether a double (or multiple) failure 
is a coupled failure, in borderline cases, suggests the policy of 
not attempting such a classification. Instead the number of double 
or multiple component failures is recorded as a variable independent 
of the single failure rate for the component. 
- il -
S. PROBABILITY OF COUPLED FAILURE - SOME SIMPLE MODELS 
The probability models described here are for the case in 
which a reliability estimate is needed for some future sys tea, or 
one for which little experience exists. Reliability data sust 
then be based on laboratory tests, or experience frost other plant, 
there will be a certain a priori uncertainty as to whether the 
situation in the plant is actually the same as in other plants or 
in the laboratory tests. In such cases coupling coefficients will 
be calculated using a priori failure probabilities, and these may 
well be different frost the probabilities later observed. 
In this section coupling coefficients and the ratio of double 
to single failures are calculated for several simple coupled 
failure situations. 
The importance of the ratio of single to double failures, is 
that it is very difficult to obtain sufficient data to establish 
coupled failure rates. The ratio of double to single failures is 
a sensitive indicator of the relative importance of coupled 
failures. 
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Bxangle_l Probability of failure to operate for a type I coupled 
failure, for two components working in parallel 
Two conponents, chosen fro« the sane production batch, and 
designed and installed in the sane way, are activated in parallel. 
There is a certain probability that the kind of activation will 
be such as to cause failure, if the components are succeptible 
to a type I common failure node. There is also a certain probability 
that a component will fail on activation, at random, by some non-
coupled failure mechanism. 
Let Pg(A) » Probability that the batch from which component 
A is chosen, is succeptible to the type I common 
failure mode. 
P_ « Probability, for any particular activation, that 
it will trigger the coupled failure mode. 
PJJ(A) - Probability that component A fails on activation, 
by some non-coupled failure mode. 
Probability of failure for a single component system. 
- P(A) - PT Pg(A) + PN(A) - PT PgCA) PN(A) 
«* P_ Pg<A) + P„(A) in most cases. 
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2COMPONENTS 
ARE CHOSEN 
FROM SAME BATCH 
SUCCEPTIBLE TO 
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V | N 
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p i 
ACTIVATION 
TRIGGERS COMMON] 
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» I * 
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O-WlS 
i 
nr 
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COMPONENTS 
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5 
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FAILSAT RANDOM 
Y I N 
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FAILS AT RANDOM 
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COMPONENTS FAIL 
P5PT+(1-P5PT)PN2*PSPT + P„2 
> 
Fig. 3. Coupling vio botch selection (design, manufacture,installation). 
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FAILURE TRIGGER 
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FAILS AT RANDOM 
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Fig. 4. Coupled failure is possible in two components 
but they are chosen separately. 
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Probability of double failure, for a two component systea subject 
to coupled failure (similar conponents) is 
Pc * PS PT + {1 " PS PT} PH2 s e e fi^«re 3 
"
 PS PT + PH2 " PS PT PH 2 
If Pg PT « 1 PH « 1 
•
 PC S PS PT + P / 
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Probability for doable failure, for a two component sys tea, 
with components net selected from the sue batch, is 
p - pT PS2* u-pT> PS2 PB2 • 2PS CI-PS: P T PB 
• [ (1-PS)2 + 2 (1-PT) Ps (i-Ps)j PH2 «ee figure 4 
•
 P
*
 PS2 + PS V " PT PS2 p»2 
4
 » S PT PM " 2 PS 2 PT PH 
+
 »•* " »S PH2 * PS 2 PS 2 
+ 2PS PH2 " 2PS2*» 
-2P P P 2 • 2P P 2 P 2 
""* S N T S M 
• *Aa+4> * *v«v i-v- 2psvl+ p i 
Assuming PH « 1 PT Pg « i PB > ?T P£ 
P • PT Ps2 + 2PT PS PH • PH2 
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Then the coupling coeff ic ient for operational r e l i a b i l i t y of a 
two component system i s 
2 2 
p P P + P - P P P 
c « _£ ~ I s * *s T * 
OR
'
2 P
 fPT PS 2 + PT P S 2 PN 2 + 2PT PS PN 
"
 2PT P S 2 PN + PN 2 " 2PT PS PN 2) 
PT PS + PN2 
,—, . 
P P + 2P P P + P 
In many practical cases, as will be seen later 
PT Pg a 0.1 PN and PN z 0*01 (This would be typical 
for some kinds of motorized valves, for example) 
Assume P-, % 1 then 
(o.l + O.ol) PN 
s > « _ 
OR
'* (o.01)PN^ + 2(0.1)Pg + PN 
m 0.1 
1.21 x 0.01 
Assume Pg J 1 then 
C °'1PN 
°
R
'
2
 " 0.1 PN2 + 2(b.l) PN2 + PN2 
0.1 .
 7 
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As the graphs of CQ_ , on the following pages show, the 
value of the ratio of reliabilities, with and without coupling 
effects, is largest (worst) when P_ is snail and when P„ is 
snail. That is, when the components involved have a generally 
high reliability, but when there is a small proportion of 
unreliable components. The value of COR _ is not very sensitive 
to PT, provided P„> P„. Note that the value P_, » 1.0 is some-
what unrealistic - such failures would be easily detected 
during testing. 
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Examgle_2 Components are selected from batches, all components 
in a batch having a constant hazard rate. But hazard 
rates vary from batch to batch. -In the coupled case, 
components are chosen from the same batch. In the non-
coupled case, components are chosen independently. 
After failure, components are repaired with meantime 
to repair completion 1/u. (This case could represent 
type II failures with continuous monitoring of oper-
ational state, or type IV failures)J The system con-
sidered has two redundant components. 
Limiting unavailability for a single component = \ + J 
drawn from a batch with a single hazard rate. 
The hazard rate distribution for the batches has two groups 
with hazard rates A.,A«« The probability of selection from a batch 
with hazard rate A. is p. 
The expected value of limiting availability for a single 
component, drawn from one of two batches 
p A, (1-p) A, 
Aj + u A2 + y 
The coupling coefficient for limiting unavailability 
A, x2 / A^ N 2 
CUA,2 
» . tø ) +(1-» (x^r) 
G^) + ( i - » ' ( ^ l 
if 
(i) 
A •* A ^ A % A * 
T - = - >> T—i- and P v-r- » U~p) T — I -
i.e. the poor batch is responsible for a reasonable proportion of 
all single failures, in spite of a small value of p 
t •* 
i t i * M i i 
» i . * » M i » i , » M ( 
| , M , l 
H . ., I M 
» . » t , . I > l I | , 1 1
 ' / 
' i . , f t , j t i i l | , i , , t i j , i l 
i . » > » >
 t * ' I \ » l i , 1 » i ; » » 
" » ' * 
i' * , » r \ ,' * * 
»• * 
*• » 
r * 
v 
- 4 5 -
The values tabulated are for 
A2 » o.l w to *2 • 0.00001 V 
X X 
-r= « 10.0 to -r± * 1000.0 
A2 2 
p - 0.1 to p - 0.001 
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Ratio of unavailability with coupled failure to unavailability without 
Xx Co«,*. ti*,i 
0.10080 
0.05623 
0.03162 
0.01778 
0*01000 
0. 00562 
0.00316 
0. 0017tf 
0.00100 
0.00056 
0.00032 
0.000 Id 
0.00010 
0.00006 
0.00003 
0.00002 
0-00001 
1 . 8 6 6 * 3 
2 . 2 0 2 3 5 
2 . 4 b 4 2 2 
2 . 6 * 8 5 3 
2 . 8 2 2 5 0 
2 . 9 0 4 9 6 
2 . 9 5 3 * 1 
2 . 9 8 2 1 1 
2 . 9 9 * 3 0 
3 . 0 0 7 4 9 
3 . U 1269 
3 . 0 1 5 6 2 
3 . 0 1 7 2 7 
3 . 0 1 8 2 0 
3 . 0 Id 72 
3 . 0 1 9 0 1 
3 . 0 1 9 1 8 
2 . 7 5 0 0 0 
2 . 7 5 0 0 0 
2-75000 
2 . 7 5 0 0 0 
2 . 75000 
2 . 7 5 0 0 0 
£ • 7 5 0 0 0 
2 . 7 5 0 0 0 
2 . 75t<00 
2 . 7 5 0 0 0 
2 . 7 5 0 0 0 
2 . 7 5 0 0 0 
2« 7 b 0 0 0 
2 . 7 5 0 0 0 
2 ' 7 * 0 0 0 
2 * 7 5 0 0 0 
2 . 7 5 0 0 0 
o, S J A ^ 
LAHBDA1/LAH0DA2= 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 l-= 0 . 1 0 0 0 f i r . 1 . J20J&U1 
ø . 5 0 0 0 0 
3 5 9 9 3 
2 4 0 2 5 
1509U 
0 9 0 9 1 
0 . 
0 . 
0 . 
0 . 
0 . 0 5 3 2 4 
0 . 0 3 0 6 5 
«!1747 
0 0 9 9 0 
Øø 5 59 
0 0 3 1 5 
0 0 1 7a 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 . 0 0 0 5 6 
0 . 0 0 0 3 2 
0 . ØøøltJ 
0 . 0 0 0 1 0 
0 . 
0 . 
0 . 
0 . 
0 . 
0 . 
u* 
0 . 0 9 0 9 1 
0 . 0 5 3 2 4 
0 . 0 3 0 6 5 
0 . 0 1 7 4 7 
0 . 0 0 9 9 0 
0 . 0 0 5 5 9 
0 . 0 0 3 1 5 
0 . uo I 7s 
0 . 0 0 1 0 0 
0 . 0 0 0 5 6 
0 . 0 0 0 3 2 
0 . 0 0 0 1 « 
0 0 0 10 
0 0 0 0 6 
0 0 0 0 3 
øøøøk: 
0 0 0 0 1 
LAMBDA 1/LAMBDA2= 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 P= 0.1000 
0.10000 
0.05623 
0.03162 
0.01770 
0.01000 
0.00562 
0.00316 
0.0017S 
0. 00100 
0.00056 
0.00032 
0.0001b 
0.00010 
0.00006 
0.00003 
0.00002 
0.00001 
019 39 
2 3 0 a 2 
4 6 0 6 a 
4 * 7 72 
7 . 2 2 9 0 1 
7. 7 1 3 7 7 
0 1 1 6 3 
18 79 3 
2 9 0 0 0 
3-OS 3 6 
3a 1 4 * 
4 0 0 2 1 
4 1 0 7 7 
4 1 6 7 2 
4 2 0 0 7 
4 2 1 9 5 
4 2 3 0 1 
 [A- 1 . 0 0 0 0 
» • 2 7 2 7 3 
« • 2 7 2 7 3 
2 7 2 7 3 
2 7 2 7 3 
2 7 2 7 3 
2 7 2 7 3 
2 7 2 73 
2 7 2 7 3 
2 72 73 
2 7 2 7 3 
0 . 2 7 2 7 3 
d - 2 7 2 7 3 
* . * 7 2 7 3 
« . 2 7 2 7 3 
* . 2 7 2 7 3 
« . 2 7 2 7 3 
a . 2 7 2 7 3 
0 . 9 0909 
0 . a 49 0 2 
0 . 759 75 
0 . 6 4 0 0 6 
ø . 5 0 0 0 0 
0 . 3 5 9 9 3 
0 . 2 4 0 2 5 
0 . 1509a 
0 . 0 9 0 9 1 
0 . 0 5 3 2 4 
0 . 0 3 0 6 5 
0 . 0 1 7 4 7 
0 . 0 0 9 9 0 
0 . 0 0 5 5 9 
0 . 0 0 3 1 5 
0 . 0 0 1 7a 
0 . ø ø l ø ø 
0 . 0 9 0 9 1 
0 . 0 5 3 2 4 
0 . 0 3 0 6 5 
0 . 0 1 7 4 7 
0 . 0 0 9 9 0 
0 . 0 0 5 5 9 
0 . 0 0 3 1 5 
0 . 0 0 1 7 a 
0 . 0 0 1 0 0 
0 . 0 0 0 5 6 
0 . 0 0 0 3 * 
ø.øøø la 
0 . 0 0 0 1 0 
0 . 0 0 0 0 6 
0 . 0 0 0 0 3 
0 . 0 0 0 0 2 
ø.øøøøl 
LAMBDA 1/LAW bDA2- 1000 0 r= 0. 1000 
0. 10000 
0.05623 
0.03162 
0.0177a 
0.01000 
0.00562 
0.00316 
0.0017a 
0.00100 
0.00056 
0.00032 
ø.øøøia 
0.00010 
0.00006 
0.00003 
0.00002 
0.00001 
3 . 2 2 5 4 3 
4 . 6 3 7 7 5 
6 . 1 1 4 3 7 
7 . 3 7 6 7 3 
a . 3 0 3 1 5 
a . 9 1 5 5 9 
9 . 2 9 4 4 4 
9 . 519 54 
9 . 6501B 
9 . 7 2 4 9 7 
9 . 7 6 7 4 5 
9 . 7 9 1 4 7 
9 . B 0 5 0 3 
9 . a 1266 
9 - a i 6 9 6 
9 . 8 19 3a 
y . d c ; 0 7 4 
H4- l .øøøø 9 . a 0 3 0 6 
9 « a 0 3 0 6 
9 . ( 5 0 3 0 6 
9 « a ø 3 ø 6 
9 . a ø 3 0 6 
9 . a ø 3 0 6 
9 . a 0 3 0 6 
9 . a 0 3 0 6 
9 . a 0 3 0 6 
9 . a ø 3 ø 6 
9 . a ø 3 ø 6 
9 « a 0 3 ø 6 
9 . a 0 3 0 6 
v . a ø 3 ø 6 
9 . a ø 3 ø 6 
9 . a 0 3 0 6 
9 . a ø J ø 6 
0 . 9 9 0 1 0 
0 . 9 a 2 5 3 
0 . 9 6 9 3 5 
0 . 9 4 6 7 6 
ø . 9 0 9 0 9 
0 . a 4 9 0 2 
ø . 7S9 75 
0 . 6 4 0 0 6 
0 . 5 0 0 0 0 
0 . 3599 4 
0 . 2 4 0 2 5 
0 . 1 5 0 9 a 
ø . 0 9 0 9 1 
ø . 0 5 3 2 4 
0 . 0 3 0 6 5 
0 . 0 1 7 4 7 
0 . 0 0 9 9 0 
0 . 0 9 0 9 1 
0 . 0 5 3 2 4 
0 . 0 3 0 6 5 
0 . 0 1 7 4 7 
0 . 0 0 9 9 0 
ø. øø ibv 
ø.øø315 
ø.øøl7a 
ø.øøløø 
Ø.øøø56 
0.00032 
ø.øøøla 
ø.øøølø 
0.00006 
Ø'ØØØØJ 
0.00002 
Ø'ØØØØl 
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Ratio of unavailability with 
*\ Cvmt'%, 
LAMBDA1/LAMBI)A2= 10 .0000 F= 
coupled f a i l u r e to u n a v a i l a b i l i t y witnout 
C-tf*,t 
ø. 0100 j»_= 
4 = 
1.0000 "UA,2 
*4 
0.»0000 
0 . 0 5 6 2 3 
0 .03162 
0 -0177« 
0* 0 1 000 
0 .00568 
0 . 0 0 3 1 6 
0 .00178 
0 . 0 0 1 0 0 
0 -00056 
0 . 0 0 0 3 2 
0 .0001b 
0 .00010 
0 . 0 0 0 0 6 
0 . 00003 
0*00002 
0 . 0 0 0 0 1 
LAMBDA1/LACIBDA2= 
0*10000 
0 .05623 
0 .03162 
0 .01778 
0 . 01000 
0 .00562 
0 . 0 0 3 1 6 
0 .00178 
0 .00100 
0 .00056 
0 . 0 0 0 3 2 
0 .00018 
0 .00010 
0 . 0 0 0 0 6 
0 . 0 0 0 0 3 
0 .00002 
0 . 0 0 0 0 1 
LAMBDA1/LAMBDA2* 
1 . 18358 
1.29 371 
1.40552 
1. 49888 
1.56627 
1.61034 
1.63742 
1.65345 
1.66273 
1.66803 
1.67104 
1.67275 
1.67371 
1.67425 
1.67455 
1.67472 
1. 67482 
100 .0000 F= 
1 . 6749 4 
2 . 6 739 7 
4. 65517 
7 .83312 
1 L 8 5 3 3 3 
15.89457 
19.24321 
2 1 . 6469 5 
23 .21330 
24. 17368 
24 . 74134 
25 .069 78 
25 .25747 
25.36399 
25. 42419 
25 . 458 15 
25. 47727 
(000-0 H= 
1 . 65289 
1 . 65289 
1 . 6 5289 
1 . 65289 
1. 6 5289 
1.65289 
1.65289 
1.65289 
1-65289 
1 . 65289 
1- 65289 
1- 65289 
1 . 65289 
1 . 65289 
1.65289 
1.65289 
1. 6 5289 
0. 0100 £ - = 
2 5 . 2 5 0 0 0 
25. 2 5000 
2 5 . 2 5000 
25 .25000 
25. 25000 
25. 25000 
25 .25000 
25 -25000 
25-25000 
25.2500k) 
25 -25000 
25-25000 
2b. 25000 
25. 25000 
25. 25000 
25 .25000 
25 .25000 
0> 0100 p )= 
0 . 50000 
0 . 3599 3 
0 . 2 4 0 2 5 
0 . 15098 
0 . 0909 1 
0 . 05324 
0 . 03065 
0 . 01747 
0 . 00990 
0- 00559 
. 0 . 0 0 3 1 5 
0 . 00 1 78 
0 . 0 0 1 0 0 
0 . 000b6 
0* 00032 
0 . 00018 
0 . 0 0 0 1 0 
1. 0000 
0 . 9 0 9 09 
0 . 8 4902 
0 . 759 75 
0 . 6 4 0 0 6 
0 . 50000 
0 . 35993 
0 . 2 4 0 2 5 
0 . 1 5 0 9 8 
0 .0909 1 
0 . 0 5 3 2 4 
0 . 0 3 0 6 5 
0 . 0 1 7 4 7 
0 . 0 0 9 9 0 
0 . 00559 
0 . 0 0 3 1 5 
0 . 00 1 78 
ø.øøløø 
| . 0000 
0 . 0 9 0 9 1 
0 . 0 5 3 2 4 
0 . 0 3 0 6 5 
0 .01747 
0*00990 
0 .00559 
0 . 0 0 3 1 5 
0 .00178 
0 . 0 0 1 0 0 
0 . 0 0 0 5 6 
0 .00032 
0* 00018 
0 .00010 
0 . 00006 
0 . 0 0 0 0 3 
0.0UU02 
0 . 0 0 0 0 1 
0.091091 
0 . 0 5 3 2 4 
0 .03065 
0 . 0 1 7 4 7 
0 .00990 
0 .00559 
0 . 0 0 3 1 5 
0* 001 78 
0 .00100 
0 .00056 
0 . 0 0 0 3 2 
0 .00018 
0* 00010 
0 . 0 0 0 0 6 
k). U0003 
0 . «300U2 
tt.tfuøØi 
ø.løøøø 
0 . 0 5 6 2 3 
0 . 0 3 1 6 2 
0 .01778 
0 . 0 1 0 0 0 
0 .00562 
0 .00316 
0 .00178 
0 .00100 
0 . 0 0 0 5 6 
0 . 0 0 0 3 2 
0 .00018 
0 .00010 
0 . 0 0 0 0 6 
0 . 0 0 0 0 3 
0 .00002 
0 . 0 0 0 0 1 
1-80204 
3. 18633 
6 .44110 
12.93444 
23 .42546 
36. 79715 
50 .33027 
61 .60402 
69 .72707 
75 .03314 
78. 29 132 
80 .21889 
8 1. 33468 
8 1 . 9 7 2 5 3 
8 2 . 3 3 4 5 5 
8 2 . 5 3 9 2 1 
8 2 . 65463 
82« 65289 
82 .65289 
82 .65289 
8 2 . 6 5289 
8 2 . 65289 
82 .65289 
82 .65289 
82 .65289 
82 .65289 
82 .65289 
8 2« 6 5289 
82 .65289 
82 .65289 
82 .65289 
8 2 . 65289 
82 .65289 
82 .65289 
ø . 9 9 0 1 0 
0 . 9 8 2 5 3 
0 . 9 6 9 3 5 
0 . 94676 
0 . 9 0 9 09 
0 . 8 49 02 
0 . 759 75 
ø . 6 4 0 0 6 
0.5U0U0 
*>• 35994 
0 . 2 4 0 2 5 
0 .15098 
0 .0909 1 
0.W5324 
ø . 0 3 0 6 5 
0 . 01747 
0 . 0 0 9 9 0 
0. U90(,' 1 
0 .U5324 
0 . 0 3 0 6 5 
0. 01747 
0 . 0 0 9 9 0 
0. 0k)559 
0 . Id031b 
0 . 00 178 
ø. 00 1 kiv 
tf. fc»øø^6 
0 .00032 
0. tføølo 
0 .00010 
id. Øøk)io6 
ø. 00003 
ø.øøøu2 
0 . ØØØttl 
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Ratio of unavailability with 
LAMBDAI/LAABDA2= 
0 . 1 0 0 0 0 
0 . 0 5 6 2 3 
0 * 0 3 1 6 2 
0 - 0 1 7 7 8 
0 . 0 1 0 0 0 
0 * 0 0 5 6 2 
0 . 0 0 3 1 6 
0* 0 0 1 7 8 
0 . 0 0 1 0 0 
0*00056 
0* 00032 
0.0001b 
Ø.Øøølø 
0*00006 
0.00003 
0* 00002 
Ø.øøøøl 
Mi 
1 . 0 2 0 0 5 
1 . 0 3 2 7 7 
1 * 0 4 6 0 8 
1 * 0 5 7 4 5 
1 . 0 6 5 7 9 
1 . 0 7 1 3 1 
1 . 0 7 4 7 2 
0 7 6 7 5 
0 7 7 9 3 
0 7 8 6 0 
0 7 8 9 9 
1 . 0 7 9 2 0 
1. 0 79 3 2 
1 * 0 7 9 3 9 
1 . 0 7 9 4 3 
1 . 0 7 9 4 5 
1 . 0 7 9 4 7 
coupled failure 
H*BfllB,p.= »» 
1 . 0 7 8 3 3 
1 . 0 7 8 3 3 
1 * 0 7 8 3 3 
! . 0 78 3 3 
1 . 0 7 8 3 3 
1 . 0 78 3 3 
I . 0 78 3 3 
1 . 0 7 8 3 3 
1 * 0 7 8 3 3 
1 * 0 7 8 3 3 
1 . 0 7 8 3 3 
1 . 0 78 3 3 
1 . 0 78 3 3 
1 . 0 7 8 3 3 
1 . 0 7 8 3 3 
1 . 0 7 8 3 3 
1 . 0 78 3 3 
to unavailability without 
Jlfløjl TJA, 2 
ø* 5øøøØ 
0*35993 
0*24025 
0* 1 5098 
0*0909 1 
0*05324 
0 . 0 3 0 6 5 
0*01747 
0*00990 
0 . 0 0 5 5 9 
. 0 . 0 0 3 1 5 
0*00178 
0 . 0 0 1 00 
0*00056 
0 . 0 0 0 3 2 
0 . 0 0 0 1 8 
0* 00010 
ut 
0 .0909 1 
0*05324 
0*03065 
ld.01747 
0 . 0 0 9 9 0 
0 . 0 0 5 5 9 
0 . 0 0 3 1 5 
0 .00178 
0-klø i 00 
0 . 0 0 0 5 6 
0 . 0 0 0 3 2 
0 .00018 
0 . 0 0 0 1 0 
0 . 0 0 0 0 6 
0 . 0 0 0 0 3 
kJ. 00002 
Ø.ØØttøl 
LAMBDA l / L AM BUA2s 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 F= 
' 0 . 1 0 0 0 0 
0.0010 
0.05623 
0*03162 
0*01778 
0.01000 
0*00562 
0*00316 
0.00178 
0.001 00 
0.00056 
0.00032 
0*00018 
0.00010 
0.00006 
0.00003 
0.00002 
0.00001 
1.0 79 48 
1 .21666 
1. 5 3 9 2 1 
2 . 1 8 2 6 9 
3 . 2 2 2 3 4 
4 . 5 4 7 4 6 
5 . 8 8 8 58 
7 . 0 0 5 8 0 
7 . 8 1 0 7 9 
8 . 3 3 6 6 2 
8 - 6 5 9 5 0 
8 . 8 5 0 5 2 
8 * 9 6 1 0 9 
9 * 0 2 4 3 0 
9 . 0 6 0 1 8 
9 . 0 8 0 4 6 
9 - 0 9 1 9 0 
£-4- 1 . 0 0 0 0 9 . 0 9 0 9 1 
9 . 0 9 0 9 1 
9 . 0 9 0 9 1 
9 . 0 9 0 9 1 
9 . 0 9 1 0 9 1 
9 . 0 9 0 9 1 
9 . 0 9 0 9 1 
9 . 0 9 0 9 1 
9 . 0 9 0 9 1 
9 . 0 9 0 9 1 
9 . 0 9 0 9 1 
9 . 0 9 0 9 1 
9 . 0 9 0 9 1 
0 9 0 9 1 
0 9 0 9 1 
10909 1 
9. 
9 . 
9-
9 . 0 9 09 1 
0 . 9 0 9 0 9 
0 . 8 4910*: 
0 . 7 5 9 7 5 
0 . 6 4 0 0 6 
0 . 5 0 0 0 0 
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§2i5&iS_3 A system consisting of two components, operating 
redundantly in parallel. The components are selected 
together from one of two batches« one with a hazard 
rate X., the other with a hazard-rate A 2- The prob-
ability of selection from the first group is p. The 
system is activated intermittently, with a constant 
probability intensity a. On failure on demand, the sys-
tem is repaired, with a mean repair time 1/u. This 
corresponds to some failures of type III. 
First solving the problem for a single component 
model for failure can be established as follows 
Po X Pl a P2 
S -mo- »O 
Pe(t) - - X PQ(t) 
P2(t) - - a Px(t) + X P0(t) 
P2(t) = o Pjft) 
PQ(t) + Px(t) + P2(t) = 1 
Taking t*^ l»c* transforms 
5P (s) - 1 = - X P (s) 
o o 
S Pjjs) = X PQ(s) - aP^s) 
S P2(s) = a Pj^s) 
PQ(s) - l/{s+X) 
5 P,(s) = X/s+X - aP,(s) 
it S P2(s) x 
- S P,(s) 
a s+X 2 
p ia; _ Xa 
*VS' s(s+X) (s+a) 
P (t) = 1 + T*~ e"Xt - J-e'at 2 X-a X-a 
density function 
ni+\ = Xa -at Xa -Xt p(t; • , e - "s— e 
*i X-a X-a 
50 -
HTTP • JJ) t p(t} dt 
X
- V *2 
a X 
^ U n a v a i l a b i l i t y (t) = ^
 + MTTR 
(Gnedenko e t a l . 1969) 
*•»
 u
 ' 1/xWl/I 
For two components, we have Uj is unavailability for components 
froæ batch 1, U, for batch 2. 
p U2 + (1-p) 02 
UA
'
2
 (p 0, + <l-p) U,) 2 
°1 2 
P {—r + i-p 
C = U2 
UA,2 
°1 2 (p(—) + 1-Pr 
U2 
This gives results very similar to those for example 2. 
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6. SIMILAR COMPONENT COUPLED FAILURES - DATA 
The data presented here are drawn from two other studies, of 
design errors and multiple failure incidents. In Risø-M-1742,first 
some design error failures were classified, then data from abnormal 
occurrences in boiling water reactors during one year, and data 
from Reactor Operating Experiences during one year were classified. 
All of these studies yielded information on the ratio of similar 
component coupled failures to single component failures. However, 
since the different failures were not classified by component 
type, the data serves only to indicate the degree to which coupled 
failure might be important. Some of the results are repeated here 
in table 1. 
In Risø-M-1837, results of a study of all available abnormal 
occurrence reports from five reactors were presented, showing an 
analysis of causes of failures, and recording the number of 
multiple failure incidents. In parallel with the results presented 
there, a study of similar component coupled failures was performed. 
The results from that study are presented here. In all, a total of 
340 abnormal occurrences were studied here. The number of failures 
was higher, because some of the abnormal occurrences involved 
several failures. 
The results of the study are presented in table 2. Some attempt 
has been made to record the number of components at risk, where 
such information was available. Multiple similar component failures 
are marked as N/M, N expressing the number of components failing, M 
2 
the number at risk.So 3 x •* means there were three cases in which 
two components failed when three were at risk. 
The similar component coupled failures are classified as types 
I, II and III. There was only one case in which a type IV failure 
occurred. 
Of the 422 independent failures recorded (failures of several 
components of the same type due to the same cause are not independent), 
121 involved actual coupled failures. 24 involved situations where 
only one of a group of components failed to function, but where 
several components of the same type were affected by the same 
mechanisms. This means that 29% of all independent failures were 
coupled failures involving two or more components. 34% of all 
failures involved coupled failure effects. (Table 2). 
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A good many of the coupled failures occurred in components 
with a long history of high failure rates. It could be argued that 
once such problem components ure identified, reliance on them 
ceases, until identification of the cause of the problem is made, 
and the failure mechanism removed. If data for these types of 
components are removed from the data, the number of coupled failures 
is reduced, to 78 or 18.5%. 
It should be noted that in many instances of single failures, 
it was not possible to determine the number of components at risk. 
In some few cases, only one component of a particular type was at 
risk. In such cases, simular component coupled failures are 
impossible. If one regards the proportion of coupled failures as 
a property of the particular component type, then the "natural" 
proportion of coupled failures will tend to be underestimated, 
from the data given here. This fact will be important if one tries 
to transfer the use of this data to power plants in which redundancy 
practice is different from the plants studied here. 
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Failure cause 
Design 
26 
Operation 
Component 
Procedure 
Installation/ 
maintenance 
Total 
65 
No common 
mode effect 
5 
19% 
3 
4 
9 
35 
54% 
Common mode effect. 
No common mode 
consequence 
7 
27% 
0 
8 
12% 
common mode 
consequence 
14 
54% 
0 
2 
2 
22 
34% 
Incidents were classified as component failures if no design 
modifications were made. Common mode failures would result in 
immediate modification, if the failures in themselves threatened 
safety and would hence be defined as design errors. 
Table 1. Common mode effects for two reactors during one year. 
(Risø-M-1742, 1974, P 62) 
For this table, all available abnormal occurrence reports 
for two reactors during one year were studied, and individual 
failures were classified according to their cause and degree of 
coupling involved. Note that some systems were not redundant, 
and that similar component common mode failures alone were 
considered. 
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Component 
Type 
Manual 
control or 
shut off 
valve 
Current trip 
relay 
Flow switch 
Control rod 
Neutron 
Monitor 
Motor 
driven fan 
* 
Failure mechanism type 
Type I 
1x2/2 
1x26/26 
Ix3/Many 
Type II 
3x1 
1x2/2 
1x3/3 
2x1 
3x2/2 
1x4/4 
6xl/Many 
2x2/Many 
4x3/Many 
Ix6/Many 
2x1 
1x2/2 
lxl 
Type III 
3x1 
1x3/3 
2x1 
1x2/2 
lxMany/Many 
Number of 
coupled 
failures 
2 
1 
5 
9 
2 
1 
Number of 
single 
failures 
6 
2 
6 
4 
1 
Table 2. Failures from Abnormal occurrence reports for five 
reactors (see Risø-M-1742) classified according to 
component and coupled failure type. 
L x M/N means L cases in which M components failed 
out of a total of N. 
* See page 8 and figure 11 for definitions. 
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f*rtT¥irv*T* o n ^ 
Type 
Storage 
battery 
Draft control 
damper 
Torque switch 
Temperature 
switch 
Motorised 
valve 
Pump control 
Check valve 
Timerrelay 
Containment 
control complej 
Failure mechanism type 
Type I 
1x2/2 
1x2/2 
1x2/2 
Type II 
1x2/2 
1x4/4 
2x1 
2x1 
21xl (The 
doui 
1x2/2 
1x4/4 
lxl 
2x1 
1x2/2 
1x3/3 
Type III 
Number of 
coupled 
failures 
1 
1 
Number of 
single 
failures 
2 
2 
only non coapled i.e. random 
le failure 
i 
__________ 
cecorded was 
3 
1 
2 
1 
; in this < 
21 
1 
2 
L x M/N means L cases in which M components failed out of 
a total of N. 
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Component 
Type 
MSIV 
(Main steam 
isolation 
valve) 
Pressure 
switch 
Solenoid 
valve 
Relief & 
Safety valves 
Vacuum 
Breaker 
valve 
Failure mechanism type 
Type I Type II 
15*1 
1*2/4 
1*1/3 
1*3/4 
1*4/4 
17*1/4 
5x2/3 
1x3/3 
5x2/4 
7x1 
1x2/2 
Ix2/Many 
1x3/3 
Ix3/Many 
3*1 
2x4/16 
Ix2/M 
2xl/Many 
1x2/2 
1x2/4 
3*4/4 
Type III 
Number of 
coupled 
failures 
4 
II 
4 
3 
5 
Number of 
single 
failures 
15 
17 
7 
3 
2 
L x M/N means L cases in which M components failed out of 
a total of N. 
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Component 
Type 
Measuring 
relay 
Core spray 
system 
water hammer) 
Switch 
Steam 
generator 
Circuit 
breaker 
Boric acid 
pump 
Diesel 
generator 
Failure mechanism 
Type I 
2/2 
Type II 
15x1 
3x2/2 
3x1 
1x2/4 
1x2/4,1x3/4 
3x1 
3x2/4,1*2/2 
1x3/4,1x1/4 
5x1/2 
17x1 
type 
Type III 
A remarkal 
nate pump: 
4x2/2 1 
Number of 
coupled 
failures 
3 
1 
1 
2 
5 
Number of 
single 
failures 
15 
3 
3 
1 
ile sequence in which < 
: failed in 
4 
every othe 
5 
17 
L x M/N means L cases in which M components failed out of 
a total of N. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
One conclusion from this study is that there is a sufficient 
number of coupled failures to make collection of statistical data 
worthwhile. The actual data collected served to indicate the kind 
of components for which data collection would be worthwhile, rather 
than as a basis for statistical estimates. The data are too sparse 
to provide other than order of magnitude estimates of reliability. 
The other conclusion must be that classification of coupled 
failures is difficult. For this reason, it is recommended that data 
should be recorded whenever several components of the same type 
fail to function, without distinguishing whether a common mode 
effect is involved, or whether the failures were independent. 
Further classification is then desirable as far as is possible 
since the different types have very different characteristics, 
for example with respect to the effect of increasing the fre-
quency of testing. 
From looking at the ratios of coupled failures to single 
failures found in practice, it can be seen that in by far the 
majority of cases the values lie in the range 1/2 to 1/20. It 
should be remembered that the samples given are often very small, 
and that data have been collected only for components which are 
highly susceptible to coupled failure. For example, there are 
very few electronic components represented in the data collection. 
From the calculations, it can be seen that for twofold 
redundant systems, the biggest discrepancy between reliability 
values, calculated with and without taking account of coupled 
failure, is found for those components which individually have 
very high reliabilities, and for which coupled failures are 
rare. 
The worst discrepancies between calculations with and without 
coupled failure would arise with component with very low 
unavailabilities - electronic circuits for example. If into this 
situation a small "bad batch" is introduced, the discrepancy 
between calculations can be large. The "bad batch" should be 
small, so that the excess failures it causes do not make a 
significant change in the overall failure rate data for single 
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components. And the failure rates in the "bad batch" should not 
be so high, that the poor components are detected during early 
testing. Then, to use such components in twofold or threefold 
redundancy can produce large failure rate prediction discre-
pancies. 
This kind of reasoning, though derived from just simple 
cases of coupled failure, focusses attention on failure rate 
distributions. One method of calculating common mode failure 
probability (WASH1400, Appendix IV) is to fit a distribution 
to failure rate estimates derived from several different sources, 
and to sample this distribution repeatedly to provide data for 
monte carlo simulations of plant reliability. Some of the 
examples show how critical the step of deriving a failure rate 
distribution. 
I 
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